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If Through the Looking Glass (Carroll 1871) is a critique of the 
regimented structures of everyday life in post-industrial England, it 
simultaneously undercuts the loose manner in which language is used 
in that world. Beyond the Looking Glass, when Humpty Dumpty 
advocates unmitigated subjectivity in communicating through 
language, he stretches the arbitrariness in the use of the English 
language to its (il)logical extreme. Many of the Looking Glass creatures, 
extensions of Alice’s psyche, similarly communicate in bizarre English 
that is another version of the language of Alice’s world. Language 
is constantly interrogated in the text for not having been revamped 
commensurately with the overhauling of rules in other spheres of life, 
and seems slovenly amidst the progress made in science, technology 
and industry. Ironically, the discourse that censures the laxity of the 
English language runs as a counter narrative to the discourse indicting 
excessive disciplining and standardisation in Victorian England, and 
has the text reading against itself.
Keywords: communication through language, post-industrial England, 
discipline, standardisation, freedom from rules
“When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more 
nor less”, says Humpty Dumpty to Alice in Through the Looking Glass (Carroll 
1871: 124). The arrogance of the statement provokes a deeper question about the 
irrationality of the English language. Humpty Dumpty’s value-charged, narcissistic 
rhetoric does not merely legitimise but in fact celebrates the subjectivity of the 
way the English language is used. The novel is an exposé of the slack syntactical 
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parameters and semantic discrepancies within which the language functions. 
Simultaneously, however, it interrogates the incommensurate standards of 
stringency in the workaday world that surrounds it. Critical consensus has read into 
the two Alice texts a critique of the excessively structured, post-industrial phase of 
Victorian England. The illogical, arbitrary mode of communication represented by 
the English language in its ordinary usage, however, does not easily correlate with 
the severe disciplinary system that underlies revitalisation in this historical period. 
 Humpty Dumpty’s self-aggrandising proclamation, within such a context, 
could simply be interpreted as his appeal for personalised constructions of words 
and their meanings. It could also be construed as an ironic reminder to Alice that the 
language she speaks is just as whimsical and devoid of objective meaning as some 
of the goings-on in the Looking Glass world which baffle her perception of what 
constitutes sense. But it is not as though Alice and Humpty Dumpty are engaged in 
an antagonistic dialogue about the virtues and failings of the English language. After 
her initial outrage at how disdainfully some of the Looking Glass creatures react 
to ostensibly perfect grammatical constructions, semantic structures, spellings and 
meanings of words in English, she is more than willing to see or even be won over 
to their point of view. The Looking Glass creatures, in spite of everything, function 
not as her opponents but as extensions of her psyche who enable her to shed some 
of the baggage of stodgy complacency that she carries with her from the real world 
in which she has grown up. Nina Auerbach avers that Alice, “prim and proper in 
her pinafore and pumps” (1973: 31), is a Victorian child, anchored in Victorian 
respectability and order, and yet a combination of “literal-mindedness and dream” 
(ibid.). Her latent propensity to escape the rigour and tedium surrounding her 
facilitates her imaginary conversations with the Looking Glass creatures. Since the 
creatures embody conflicts within herself, these chats stimulate her to engage with 
some of the ways of the world, including its linguistic incoherence. The exchanges, 
therefore, also open up hitherto unexplored, introspective spaces within her that go 
against mainstream assumptions in curiously divergent ways. She hardly realises 
that her views (or the Looking Glass creatures’ comments) about rules vs. leniency 
or order vs. chaos vis-à-vis the discipline of life and the discipline of language 
are greatly contrary. In Alice’s interactions with the Looking Glass creatures, I 
therefore decode prime illustrations of the text reading against itself. The discourse 
that censures the looseness and the senselessness of the English language is not 
only at odds with, but runs as a counter narrative to, the discourse indicting the 
disproportionately meticulous observation of rules in every other sphere of life. 
It is a critical commonplace to read both Alice books as “representative of 
repressed Victorian childhood […] surrounded by irrational, rule-making and 
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solipsistic adults” (Hunt 2001: 46). Many critics have expressed in diverse ways 
that the texts ridicule “smug formalism and copy-book maxims” (Knoepflmacher 
1998: 154) or condemn “a world that privileges reason, progress and strict codes 
of morality and behavior” (Thacker and Webb 2002: 14). The word ‘queer’ is used 
in the two books at least twenty times, says Seth Lehrer, to “define experience 
outside the strictures of Victorian propriety” (2008: 195). In England, the bourgeois 
ideas of time and discipline which led to a hitherto unprecedented regimentation 
in homes and schools found one of its severest critics in Carroll’s Alice. The 
homogenisation of the treatment of childhood during the Industrial Revolution 
and its aftermath had reduced the child almost to an assembly line product (see 
Thompson 1981). Alice breaks out of this pre-programmed format and is pleasantly 
surprised to find everything topsy-turvy and not abiding by any rules of society, 
law or any other institution in Wonderland, or in the land of the Looking Glass. 
Alice’s predilection to dream of situations where she can elude the shackles of her 
workaday life represents the child’s resistance to the decorum and regimentation of 
the adult world. 
The adult domain that would, one assumes, eventually assimilate Alice within 
it had lately accomplished fundamental structural changes that revamped but also 
quite certainly destroyed the presumably laid-back lifestyle of the freer and more 
spontaneous pre-industrial world. The intimidating railway journey that is imposed 
on Alice, with its prioritisation of time and money, for instance, provokes her to 
say that she does not belong to the railway journey at all and evokes her nostalgia 
about the wood she has just been through. Subsequently, when she is on the boat 
with the sheep, Alice’s lament that the prettiest rushes are always furthest away 
correspondingly uncovers a kind of romantic longing in her, but is followed soon by 
her abrupt relocation to the claustrophobic space of the little dark shop, a distasteful 
reality in the post-industrial world. Brooks and trees alternate with shops and trains 
as Alice moves along the squares of the imaginary chess board which is an exemplar 
that reinforces the co-existence of free and disorderly playing within a code of 
strict rules. Alice’s commentary, however, decisively decries the streamlining of 
life with regulations, technology, inventions and monetary transactions, and seems 
to suggest that the world was more charming without them. 
But paradoxically, as Alice realises through her dialogues with the Looking 
Glass creatures/herself, the extant rules in language have not been questioned and 
reformulated in keeping with the markers of reason, structure and modernity in real 
life. Communication through language in Victorian England, the text appears to 
insinuate, leaves much to be desired. Established modes of Anglophone linguistic 
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articulation might have intermittently undergone some cosmetic changes of spelling 
or rejected and replaced words that have become obsolete. Unusually fashioned 
sentences, awkward and problematic terminology, and eccentric idiomatic 
expressions that supposedly communicate information, feelings and ideas, 
however, continue to be mired in a sloppy changelessness. Such a stasis that cannot 
sustain or augment the faculty of learning which deals with verbal exchanges is 
virtually retrogressive amidst the no-nonsense and updated co-ordinates of science, 
technology and industry in the corporeal world. The poem “Jabberwocky”, on the 
other hand, is a fine example of accurate metrical and syntactic rules combined 
with semantic creativity and freedom – a blend that Alice can hardly boast of in 
her real life. In her own world, lately accomplished straitjacketed reconfigurations 
and codes are at odds with an accompanying deficiency in linguistic overhauling. 
The English language of real life is neither perfectly systematised nor appealingly 
innovative – it is illogical and arbitrary. Unlike Donald Rackin, I would not say that 
all this affirms “the sane madness of ordinary existence” (1966: 325) but exposes 
the contrary pulls of the supposedly sane contemporary co-ordinates of living and 
the incompatible madness of the English language. 
The world of Through the Looking Glass deplores the constraints of 
conveniently standardised, time-based, money-centred, pre-planned arrangements 
that are accompanied by the loss of freedom and personal choice in our quotidian 
occupations. According to Patricia Meyer Spacks, “[…] the apparent chaos of the 
dream-world is less disorderly than the lack of discipline in the real world […]” 
(2000: 165). Curiously, this dream-world does not simultaneously glorify a loosely 
designed language that borders on being customised according to convenience. 
When Alice supports the absurd use of certain words and phrases in English that are 
challenged by the Looking Glass creatures, she blindly follows a rule book that she 
has internalised. The text does not merely demolish the severe operative structures 
of industrialisation along with the limp organisational principles of the English 
language rule book. Instead, unable to work out any equivalence between the 
two incongruous systems, it appeals for some flexibility within a world governed 
by mechanised arrangements, while sardonically questioning the laxity and 
communication gap engendered by the English language that is ingrained within 
that very rigid scheme of things. While the order of the real world is valued by its 
adult inhabitants, the English language, in all its disordered unruliness, is equally 
valorised by them without any reservations. The creatures of Alice’s extended 
consciousness, on the other hand, relentlessly defy both. 
To start by exploring the interlocutions within the linguistic matrix of Through 
the Looking Glass, there is the altercation between Alice and her sister about 
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whether the two of them could pretend to be kings and queens. The sister objects 
to the proposal since that would involve at least four people. At the end of the 
transaction, Alice compromises by replying that her sister could be one of them 
while she could be the rest, keeping open imaginative possibilities within her while 
letting her sister be confined to a bare fact. The sister, obsessed with nit-picking 
about “singulars” and “plurals” that can be used in the sentence, cannot let herself 
go in the make-believe of “Let’s pretend” to the extent of inventively fashioning 
four people out of two. If they could theoretically be metamorphosed into “kings” 
and “queens”, which would likewise pose various hurdles of identity, gender and 
social status, an ideational reconstitution of the number of people involved in the 
charade should not seem so shockingly unreasonable to her sister. But the sister 
is enmeshed in a web that has been fashioned to deal majorly with numbers and 
quantities and cannot accept anything that does not adhere to its norms. Yet she 
is not correspondingly scandalised by the empirically unfeasible prospect of their 
being kings and queens. 
Alice’s ultimate nightmare of a quantity-crazed world is one in which time 
is worth a thousand pounds a minute, land is worth a thousand pounds an inch, 
smoke is worth a thousand pounds a puff and language is worth a thousand pounds 
a word. On the other hand, when Humpty Dumpty’s “nice knock-down argument” 
related to time and numbers to Alice about how much better it is to get 364 un-
birthday presents than only one surprisingly has the potential for a wishful escape 
from the time-centric rhythms of the world, invented by people who are obsessed 
with computing everything in terms of numbers. In Humpty Dumpty’s utopian 
scheme of things, the significant celebratory signposts that mark our age as we 
grow older are of no consequence if we do not assign such import to one specific 
date in the calendar but consider all other days as equally if not more noteworthy 
and auspicious. The 364 days of Humpty Dumpty’s contention, therefore, is not a 
quantitative calculation whatsoever but a perspective that oversteps number- and 
time-related milestones with aplomb, only to enable endless festivities and gifts 
galore in the bargain. Similarly, although the formidable Red Queen admonishes 
Alice for not knowing her Arithmetic, Alice, who is too much of a creature/student 
of the real world she has left behind, is outraged by the Red Queen’s preposterous 
numeral-divested calculations of dividing a loaf by a knife or subtracting a bone 
from a dog in which what remains is the dog’s temper. Like the interaction with 
Humpty Dumpty, this one, aggravating as it is to Alice, conjures up the possibility 




In the Looking Glass world, Alice is repeatedly sensitised to the inconsistencies 
of the English tongue whose cultural legacy, with all its time-honoured but ridiculous 
regulations, does the English-speaking world proud. A word should uniformly 
mean one thing, feels Alice, when she says to Humpty Dumpty: “The question 
is,” […] “whether you can make words mean so many different things” (Carroll 
1871: 124). As far as Alice is concerned, this is a rhetorical question, for, according 
to her, words can hardly act as vehicles of communication if they mean different 
things at different times. Humpty Dumpty perplexes her further by replying that 
he can “master” and “manage” words because the end of communication is not 
cogency and lucidity but what he calls “impenetrability”. Humpty Dumpty does not 
really explain what he means by the word except to confuse Alice with a garbled 
sermon ending with how they should move on to the next topic. But his utterance 
of the word “impenetrability” is perhaps a summing up of conventionally accepted 
but opaque and obscure verbalisations. Alice’s question about whether one word 
can be made to mean two different things rebounds on her as the conversations 
in the novel feature many words in English that change colour, emphasis or even 
meaning, depending on their context. In a dialogue between her and the Gnat in 
Chapter IV, she designates as a bad joke his pun on the word “Miss”. However, one 
hardly has to read between the lines to realise the implications of the discrepancy 
between the two same words with absolutely different meanings. One is a formal 
way of addressing a girl and the other means something like “fail to notice” or 
“let something go by”, both of which are spelt and pronounced in the same way 
in English. Equivocations on many other such pairs of words illustrate the lack of 
inventiveness in the evolution of the English language (or any natural language) 
that is supposedly so impoverished of words that it has to take recourse, at times, 
to the same word to denote different things and ideas. It resorts to homonyms and 
homophones to designate diverse things, but sometimes also uses discrete verbs, 
nouns, and adjectives in an unintelligible, impenetrable muddle. The word ‘ground’ 
(a noun) that means a specific piece of land, and the same word that signifies the 
past tense of ‘grind’ (a verb) are not only pronounced but spelt the same way. 
The other two pairs of words (flower–flour and bough–bow) are at least spelt 
differently, but the fantasy world of Looking Glass is presumably non-literate and 
does not take into account written communication, at least within what we can 
see in the text itself. Such ambivalence of signification around divergent uses of 
the same word causes endless bewilderment, which could be resolved simply by 
different nomenclatures for different things. It is implied that the twenty-six letters 
of the English alphabet could surely have been combined in virtually innumerable 
permutations and combinations for the sake of greater clarity of communication. 
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The dream world, therefore, is a world in which language is taken seriously 
(see Spacks 2000: 172). But the Looking Glass creatures do not read parallels, 
echoes, connotations and reflections within the use of language, and decontextualise 
the language to an extent that it seems to be at war with itself – saying something 
at odds with what it intends to mean. In a larger sense, this kind of reading aims to 
recognise “a relationship […], between what [the writer] commands and what he 
does not command” (Derrida 1976: 158). One can read into the text the paradoxes 
and contradictions of some conventional grammatical constructions that sometimes 
dismantle equally established linguistic combinations. Being smugly conformist 
about the use of phrases like “answering the door”, for instance, the indignant and 
judgmental grammarian in Alice is not confronted by the same deadlock as the 
Frog. Alice does not even pause to think about the odd phrasings and combinations 
of words that are already in use. The Frog’s question about what it is that the door 
asked that somebody should answer attains validity only when seen in conjunction 
with other such knotty plays on words by the creatures of the Looking Glass world.
The use of negatives, absences, binaries and polarities in Chapter VI makes 
the reader conscious that one only has available certain specific words that are 
prefixed with an ‘un’ to create their antonyms. But there are words and words in 
the dictionary to which one could innovatively add an ‘un’ for them to become 
antonyms, providing new and interesting possibilities of engaging with them. Word 
combinations in English as a natural language are not contained within severe 
strictures of sense, so Humpty Dumpty merely stretches the gibberish of the lexicon 
to construct what is Alice-the-grammarian’s nightmare. Humpty Dumpty’s “un-
birthday present”, representing one such use of language that could enlarge our 
vocabulary, goes a little overboard in adding the prefix ‘un’ to a noun instead of to 
an adjective, which would have made better sense. However, Humpty’s ingenious 
use of the prefix, as I have already mentioned, also has the creative potential 
to tempt the child in us with the prospect of receiving gifts on all days except 
birthdays – all year round, in fact. The invocation of words that can be added to the 
English language by adding a simple prefix or by distorting them a little opens up 
frontiers and vistas that would henceforth not abide by any moribund proscriptions 
on crossing linguistic thresholds. “Meaning is literal”, says Jacqueline Flescher, 
“but language is imaginative. It is language which governs meaning and determines 
the creative process” (1969: 140). Some preposterous prefixes have already been 
subsumed into the already prevalent language without much ado, or without being 
questioned by pedagogues and linguistic experts, despite the bizarrely nonsensical 
pictures they engender. “Tiger-lily”, “turtle-dove”, “dragon-fly”, “butter-fly” 
and “horse-fly” are some illustrations that are discussed in Chapter II, but new 
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dimensions are accreted to them by the use of further prefixes that evoke images of 
laboratory-produced crossbreeds, like “snap-dragon-fly”, “bread-and-butter-fly” or 
“rocking-horse-fly” (cf. Carroll 1871). Juxtaposed to these, the indiscriminate use 
of ‘un’ as a prefix to create the opposite of a word is relatively innocuous and sane, 
yet it does not seem to have the sanction of linguistic authority. 
The conception of names undergoes an analogous trial to that of prefixes. The 
Gnat disputes that the names of insects are of no use anyway since insects do not 
answer to names. In Chapter VIII, the Knight who brags about his own inventions 
calls the song “Haddock’s Eyes” by sundry names, depending on whether the 
question is about: a) what it is, b) what it is called, c) what it is named or d) what 
its name is called. This is the Knight’s rejoinder to the specious logic of the English 
language that has so many different ways of saying the same thing. Its flip side 
would be to philosophically absorb the Shakespearian dictum that a rose by any 
other name would smell as sweet. A sub-text on proper nouns is also woven into 
the discourse on names. The names of living things, including human beings, 
hardly mean anything, and are yet so important to us because of the illusory sense 
of identity and self-worth they confer on us. In the wood “where things have no 
names” (Carroll 1871: 61), Alice goes through a transitory phase of amnesia where 
she can neither remember her own name nor that of the fawn. Almost reduced to 
tears, as they find themselves at the end of the wood, she is enabled with the help 
of the Fawn to remember at least the taxonomy under which she can place herself 
– that of a human child. For the Fawn, who similarly recalls that he is a Fawn, 
it is sufficient to classify the species to which he or Alice belong, for all other 
living creatures are content with their generic identity. Alice’s preoccupation with 
recollecting her first name seems superfluous and self-indulgent in such a context. 
To mention just a few wordings that are also put to the test, the White Queen 
bribes Alice with the prospect of having jam every other day. The phrase “every 
other day” can be deconstructed as “the other of every day”, which amounts to 
mean “never”. The Queen really hopes to cheat Alice by tempting her with a 
conditionality whose allure will yield no reward for her, and also ensure that the 
Queen’s material resources are not depleted. This kind of deployment of language is 
as reasonable or unreasonable as the meaning gleaned by human beings or the frog 
from the phrase “answering the door”. The asymmetry of the known and accepted 
English language, giving us the leeway to perpetually innovate with its words, is 
thus under the relentless scrutiny of the Looking Glass creatures.
The interpenetrating narratives – the challenging of the routine and monotony 
of a world that is governed by a rigorous system predicated on time and money (for 
instance, Alice’s railway journey in Chapter III), and the undercutting of the same 
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world that has no schematic blueprint but is casual, in fact lackadaisical, in the way 
its inmates talk – mirror each other. They are, of course, not exact reflections of each 
other, just as Tweedledum and Tweedledee’s left and right limbs and eyes do not 
correspond to each other. There is something awry on this side that has a potential 
for improvement in the Looking Glass version. An easygoing, carefree attitude to 
language co-exists with the harshly streamlined codes that are followed in day-to-
day business and pleasure, work and play on this side of the Looking Glass world. 
Beyond the mirror is reflected an ideal world that appeals for its stricter linguistic 
standards and yet a life freed of irksome standardisation. The irreverence about 
both the actualities, which intriguingly develop as a kind of thesis and antithesis 
and are never reconciled, makes a travesty of the critique itself. It blurs the interface 
between what is real and what is unreal, what is established and what is desirable, 
what is homogenised and what is particularised, what is restricted and what is 
free. The text reads against its own current by confounding our perception of the 
principles and norms that are its objects of derision.
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Alica u Omaškozemskoj: (ne)sustavi života i jezika s onu stranu 
zrcala
Ako roman Alica s onu stranu zrcala (Carroll 1871) predstavlja kritiku krutih struktura 
svakodnevice u postindustrijskoj Engleskoj, on istovremeno podriva slobodnu uporabu 
jezika u vlastitu romanesknome svijetu. Kada Dundo Bumbo (Humpty Dumpty) onkraj zrcala 
zagovara sveopću subjektivnost u jezičnoj komunikaciji, on rasteže proizvoljnost uporabe 
engleskoga jezika do njezinih (ne)logičnih granica. Mnoga zrcalna stvorenja (produžetci 
Aličine psihe) na sličan se način u komunikaciji služe bizarnim jezikom koji je inačica 
jezika Aličina svijeta. Budući da izvrtanje pravila u drugim sferama života nije rezultiralo 
odgovarajućim promjenama na jezičnome planu, u tekstu se neprestano propitkuje i iskušava 
jezik koji se u usporedbi s napretkom ostvarenim na polju znanosti, tehnologije i industrije 
doima nehajnim. Ironično je što diskurs koji prigovara učmalosti engleskoga jezika ujedno 
služi kao protunarativ diskursu koji kritizira pretjerano discipliniranje i standardizaciju u 
viktorijanskoj Engleskoj, pa se tekst u konačnici čita protiv samoga sebe. 
Ključne riječi: jezična komunikacija, postindustrijska Engleska, disciplina, standardizacija, 
oslobađanje od pravila 
Alice in Fehlerland: Lebens- und Sprach-(Un)-Systeme hinter 
den Spiegeln
Versteht man den Roman Alice hinter den Spiegeln (Carroll 1871) als eine Kritik der steifen 
Alltagsstrukturen im nachindustriellen England, dann ist diesbezüglich festzustellen, 
dass dort auch der freie Sprachgebrauch innerhalb der eigenen Romanwelt unterwandert 
wird. Indem Goggelmoggel nämlich hinter den Spiegeln für einen allzersetzenden Einsatz 
der Subjektivität im Sprachgebrauch plädiert, dehnt dieser die Willkürlichkeit in der 
Verwendung des Englischen bis zu ihren (un)-logischen Grenzen aus. Ähnlich bizarrer 
Sprachgebrauch ist auch einigen anderen Spiegelwesen (als Verlängerungen der Psyche 
von Alice) eigen. Da die Regelverdrehungen in anderen Lebensbereichen zu keinen 
entsprechenden Veränderungen des Textes auf seiner Sprachebene führten, hat man den 
Eindruck, als ob man im Text immer wieder die Sprache, deren Fortschritt gegenüber 
demjenigen im Bereich der Wissenschaften, der Technologie und der Industrie eher gering 
erscheint, hinterfragt und auf die Probe stellt. Ironisch wirkt dabei, dass man den Diskurs, 
womit man die Lethargie des Englischen aufs Korn nimmt, zugleich als Gegenmittel zum 
Diskurs verwendet, worin die übertriebene Disziplinierung und Standardisierung des 
viktorianischen Englands kritisiert wird, sodass man schließlich den Text als gegen sich 
selbst gerichtet lesen kann. 
Schlüsselwörter: Sprachkommunikation, nachindustrielles England, Disziplin, 
Standardisierung, Regelbefreiung
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